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This essay identifies epistemologi-
cal, theoretical and methodological 
problems in a potentially influential 
subset of the interdisciplinary cor-
porate responsibility literature, that 
which appears in the management 
literature.  The received conceptu-
alization of stakeholder analysis is 
criticised by identifying six sets of 
factors conventionally considered as 
promoting social responsibilities in 
the firm: inter-organizational factors, 
economic competitors, institutional 
investors, end-consumers, govern-
ment regulators and non-gov-
ernmental organizations.  Each is 
addressed on conceptual grounds, 
its empirical salience in terms of the 
latest relevant research and pros-
pects to be a significant factor in 
promoting outcomes consistent with 
social welfare.  Despite obvious an-
tagonistic relations between organi-
zation-centred economic objectives 
and extra-organizational-directed 
social considerations, the huge body 
of research we address drifts in a 
disengaged Sargasso Sea.  The essay 
argues for appropriate directions for 
continuing business ethics/responsi-
bility/corporate citizenship research, 
suggesting certain sociological 
works on moral leadership, moral 
courage, and academic leadership.
Keywords
Stakeholder management, corporate 
responsibility, ethical investment, 
ethical consumerism, non-govern-
mental organizations.
A Critical Review of Relations between  
Corporate Responsibility Research and Practice
1. Introduction
The original corporate charter’s ideal re-
lations of propriety between corporate 
and non-corporate forms of organization 
were always regaled as quaint.  A century 
later, Berle and Means (1932) had wed-
ded corporate social responsiveness to 
the economic interests of stockholders. 
By the end of the twentieth century, he-
gemonic market interests had sidelined 
social responsibilities to the distant argot 
of business ethics.  Most of the corporate 
responsibility research appearing in the 
management literature has only reiﬁed 
the Cartesian wedge between economic 
interests of the ﬁrm and wider concerns 
of social welfare.  
This essay claims to make a contri-
bution by noting signiﬁcant epistemo-
logical, theoretical and methodological 
problems stemming from this unhelpful 
hierarchy between business and society. 
Our purpose is to suggest a need for CSR 
researchers to rediscover fresh meanings 
in their work.  As researchers working in 
accounting and organizational strategy, 
we are drawn together by our doubts 
that joining a search for mechanisms and 
changes to authentic practice is a worth-
while project.  What we oﬀer is a critical 
narrative of the theoretical arguments in 
support of corporate social responsibili-
ties.  
Common publishing avenues for the 
management studies we address are large-
circulation journals such as California 
Management Review, Harvard Business 
Review (boasting 240,000 subscribers in 
late 2005), European Management Jour-
nal, Corporate Governance, Academy of 
Management Journal, Academy of Man-
agement Review, Business and Society, 
Business and Society Review, Business 
Ethics Quarterly, and Journal of Business 
Ethics.  Despite obvious antagonisms 
between economic and social concerns 
at the level of the ﬁrm, this research ad-
dresses, in the main, superﬁcial expres-
sions of CSR.  
The article divides into three main 
Sections.  The next Section outlines the 
received exposition of corporate social 
responsibilities (CSR), the arguments for 
and against the business assumption of 
social responsibilities, and common de-
ployments of stakeholder management.  
A following Section addresses the call 
from O’Dwyer, Unerman and Bradley 
(2005) for work identifying the inﬂuence 
of stakeholder groups on social responsi-
bility practice.  
A ﬁnal Section addresses whether the 
combined force of these inﬂuences is suf-
ﬁcient to invest capitalism with genuine 
responsibility credentials or whether at-
tention directed at the level of the ﬁrm 
ultimately amounts to an ideological 
distraction from capitalist pathologies, 
a palliative for the ‘chardonnay socialist’ 
set, a rearranging of deck chairs on a liner 
lost in the Sargasso Sea.  We conclude by 
suggesting directions for business eth-
ics/responsibility/corporate citizenship 
research in such as the work of Foucault 
on moral leadership, of Freire on moral 
courage, and of Bourdieu on academic 
leadership.
2. Corporate responsibility  
and stakeholder management
Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995) contend 
that most of the corporate responsibil-
ity research coalesces around an under-
speciﬁed form of stakeholder theory that 
concerns itself only with self-reporting. 
Such tendencies persist a decade later 
in both the accounting and management 
literatures.  The discourse of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) is taken up 
by discussions of voluntary, impliedly ob-
ligatory, corporate responses to observed 
serious damage, or likely serious damage, 
to ecological and social systems.  Accord-
ing to Wood (1991, p. 692), the basic idea 
of CSR is that “business and society are 
interwoven rather than distinct entities; 
therefore, society has certain expecta-
tions for appropriate business behaviour 
and outcomes.”  Such expectations are 
motivated primarily by economic exter-
nalities.  
We deﬁne CSR in terms of organi-
zational actions that promote a greater 
internalization of negative economic 
externalities or a greater generation of 
positive economic externalities.  We add 
to Abelson’s deﬁnition of externalities 
(2002, p. 159): “any positive (beneﬁcial) 
or negative (harmful) eﬀect that market 
exchanges have on ﬁrms or individuals 
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[or ecological systems or human communities] who do not par-
ticipate directly in [or beneﬁt from] those exchanges”.
Business ethicists borrow from the works of such as Tho-
mas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau to assert 
that normative obligations on the ﬁrm imposed by the social 
contract require constructive responses to the needs of owner 
and non-owner groups (Palmer, 2001; Dunfee and Donaldson, 
1995).  Ethics and responsibility are most often unreﬂexively 
presented as atomised problems for individual decision-mak-
ers in the ﬁrm, solvable through straightforward application of 
logical rules and codes of conduct (see, Adams, Tashchian and 
Shore, 2001; Marks and Mayo, 1991; Marnburg, 2000; Pater 
and van Gils, 2003).  
Relevant deﬁnitions of responsibility have been narrow: “is-
sues of corporate responsibility are of smaller scope than the 
ethical foundations of capitalism” (Goodpaster, 1983, p. 3). 
Ethical questions are restricted to external corporate eﬀects 
such as the means of production, in which relevant questions 
are held to arise in places such as stockholder and consumer 
protection and occupational health and safety.  Exemplary be-
haviour is encoded in governance guidelines emanating from 
such as stock exchanges.  The CSR-related research that we ad-
dress ﬂags moral justiﬁcation with one hand as it defers to the 
mechanics of capital on the other.  
Four aspects describe conventional approaches.  
1. One, corporate entities are assumed responsible only 
for their own (acquisitive) behaviour and not for capitalism it-
self.  This assumption would explain why most CSR research-
ers leave undeﬁned categories of obligation and forms that the 
social contract should take and rarely consider alternatives to 
neo-liberalism (Lehman, 1999).  
2. Two, a related assumption is that self-regulation is a 
proper normative ideal for corporate entities (Gray, Owen and 
Maunders, 1988).  Voluntary CSR reporting is assumed, with-
out examination, to suﬃciently acquit the ﬁrm of extra-legal re-
sponsibilities.  
3. Three, economics is not identiﬁed as a matter of choice. 
Institutional and legal status qua, market forces and the legal-
ity of corporations to accumulate private property are reiﬁed as 
part of the “fundamental legitimacy of capitalism” (Goodpaster, 
1983, p. 3), in accordance with its neo-liberal underpinnings 
(Lehman, 1999).  Moral agency is received with as little critical 
reﬂection.  
4. Finally, inherent contradictions between the pursuit of 
economic growth and goals of ecological maintenance and social 
justice are considered, if at all, as trivial.  In their own reviews 
of the business ethics literature, Bowie and Dunfee (2002) and 
Shaw (1996) and Solomon (1993) note that the CSR-related 
management-focused research (the subject of this essay) tends 
to avoid reﬂecting on conﬂicts between ethical and proﬁt mo-
tives.
We note that standard expositions overlook three diﬀerences 
between privately held and corporate social responsibilities.  
One, contracting relationships do not automatically exhibit 
the characteristics of moral agency possible in non-contracting 
relations.  In business, one party represents a cost to the other, 
which is not the case in intersubjectively shifting relations such 
as those between friends and family (Attﬁeld, 2000; Noreen, 
1988).  
Two, legal limited liability protects managers and corpora-
tions from the moral implications of a corporation’s actions/
non-actions (Graham, 2001).  Individuals seeking protection 
from consequences arising out of their capacities as individuals 
can only seek partial insurance and with no guarantee of suc-
cess.  
Three, corporate managers and directors need only be con-
cerned with circumstances impacting on the execution of busi-
ness plans.  In contrast, economic incentives and moral concerns 
are co-extensive in the professional business manager, even if 
the former often outweighs the latter (O’Dwyer, 2003).
The remainder of this Section divides into two.  Section 
2.1 outlines the received normative arguments for and against 
CSR initiatives at the level of the ﬁrm.  Section 2.2 appraises 
the epistemological limitations of stakeholder management as a 
continuing paradigm for CSR research. 
2.1 Pro and con CSR practice
Arguments for CSR
Normative arguments acknowledging a need for CSR are based 
on ethical or instrumental rationales, while those against are 
based on institutional function or property rights perspectives 
( Jones, 1996).  Ethical rationales are derived from religious 
principles, philosophical frameworks or prevailing social norms. 
Ethicists argue that ﬁrms are compelled to behave in a socially 
responsible manner because it is the morally correct thing to do. 
In its extreme, ethics-based advocates of CSR would support 
such behaviour even in instances in which it involves an unpro-
ductive resource expenditure for the ﬁrm.  
The more commonly invoked instrumental arguments in 
favour of social responsibility are based on a rational calcula-
tion that CSR actions will beneﬁt the individual ﬁrm over time. 
Such arguments rely on organizational legitimation.  By ap-
pearing responsible, a ﬁrm can proactively anticipate and avoid 
government regulations, exploit opportunities arising from in-
creasing levels of cultural, environmental and sexual awareness, 
diﬀerentiate its products from those of less proactive competi-
tors, and continue to privilege economic pursuits.  
In eﬀect, the market orientation of CSR guarantees that wide-
spread changes to corporate practices will not appear.  Although 
the instrumental argument might allow the CSR concept to be 
promoted, it is underpinned by the legal obligation of a ﬁrm to 
maximise economic beneﬁts accruing to its owners.  Business 
managers are likely to entertain the involvement of a promo-
tional NGO in corporate policy only if they can expect some 
type of economic beneﬁt.  Opportunity for super-normal proﬁt 
fades to the extent that other ﬁrms practise CSR.  Accordingly, 
the instrumental argument dictates that ﬁrms ‘protect’ their 
CSR initiatives. 
The perspective is illustrated by T. Jones (1995, p. 422): 
“[B]ehavior that is trusting, trustworthy, and cooperative, not 
opportunistic, will give the ﬁrm a competitive advantage.  In the 
process it may help explain why certain “irrational” or altruistic 
behaviours turn out to be productive and why ﬁrms that engage 
in these behaviours survive and often thrive.” 
Contra arguments to CSR
The case against social responsibility is based on concepts of 
institutional function and property rights.  
The institutional function argument asserts that non-corpo-
rate institutions such as governments, labour unions, civic and 
religious organizations are the proper vehicles to perform the 
types of functions required by social responsibility; that busi-
ness managers have neither the skills nor the time to implement 
public policy; and that an empowered business sector would not 
be accountable for its actions, unlike governmental bodies held 
accountable through electoral mechanisms.  Allowing or en-
couraging business to expand its institutional role according to 
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the tenets of social responsibility is dangerous in that it allocates 
tremendous authority without accountability (Levitt, 1958).
The property rights argument against social responsibility has 
its roots in neoclassical capitalism and continues to be inﬂuen-
tial due to its simplicity and resonance with the views of many 
in the business community, particularly those in ﬁnancial servic-
es.  By ﬁnancial services we refer to public banking institutions, 
pension funds, insurance corporations, stock exchanges, broker-
age corporations, managed investment corporations, investment 
trusts, personal investment planners, advisers and brokers.  The 
property rights perspective maintains that management has 
no right to do anything other than act in ways which increase 
stockholder value (Benston, 1982; Friedman, 1970).  To do oth-
erwise constitutes a violation of management’s legal, moral and 
ﬁduciary responsibilities.  
Although the property rights perspective has gained a deal of 
notoriety, its continuing salience was readily observable in the 
wave of leveraged buyouts in the corporate sector during the 
1960s and 1980s (and on current indications, the 2000s).  The 
rationale for these transactions was (is) the primacy of stock-
holder rights over those of auxiliary stakeholders and manage-
ment’s corresponding duty to maximise economic performance.
2.2 Stakeholder management
Freeman functionally deﬁnes an organizational stakeholder 
(1984, p. 46) as “any group or individual who can aﬀect or is 
aﬀected by the achievement of the [relevant] organization’s ob-
jectives”.  The managerial CSR-related literature, which places 
the organization’s ‘interests’ squarely in the centre, deﬁnes stake-
holder groups not by consensus on what might constitute an 
organizational stakeholder, but by frequency of mention.  An 
organizational stakeholder can be classiﬁed on proximity or on 
inﬂuence.  
Groups external to the operations of organizations include 
retail and institutional stockholders, asset analysts, business 
media, public regulatory agencies, non-governmental organi-
zations, business schools and urban/non-urban environments. 
Groups closer to organizations include suppliers, customers, 
employees and communities (or societies) local to the opera-
tions of organizations.  
Dominant stakeholders describe groups with direct and well-
established legal claims on organizational resources.  Auxiliary 
stakeholders (‘diﬀuse’: Antonacopoulou and Méric, 2005) refer 
to those parties whose claims on organizational resources are 
less well-established in law or custom (Clarkson, 1991).  Stock-
holders are conventionally considered functionally separate 
from other stakeholders as stockholders’ legal claims on the ﬁrm 
(and relative control on allocative capacity) are prioritised over 
those of others.  Most analyses draw a simplistic mutual exclu-
sion between stockholders and other claimants on the ﬁrm.  The 
complexities that would be introduced by, for example, stock op-
tions granted to executive management are rarely considered.
The technique of stakeholder analysis involves identifying 
relevant stakeholders in a speciﬁc situation.  Their relevance de-
pends on the relative force of their claims and the familiarity of 
the organization with stakeholders’ expectations and informa-
tion requirements (Dawkins, 2005).  The ‘hub and spoke’ con-
ceptualization of organizational stakeholders justiﬁes prioritis-
ing stakeholders’ concerns according to their inﬂuence on the 
status of the organization.  The organization is not portrayed, 
for example, as a stakeholder itself with ‘social interests’ at the 
centre of the relevant situation.  
Stakeholder management might be distinguished from stake-
holder analysis by a normative (reifying) interest to introduce 
the interests and anticipated reactions of relevant stakeholders 
into decision-making processes of the organization at the centre 
of the situation (Freeman, 1991).  Stakeholder management, 
not necessarily associated with a particular normative position, 
can be useful for ﬁrms following ethically or instrumentally 
based notions of CSR as much as for ﬁrms simply acting within 
legal and ethical constraints germane to their business system 
( Jones and Fleming, 2003).  
This aspect of stakeholder management would justify its lo-
cation within the domain of strategic management.  Its most 
integrative doctrine directs management to pursue outcomes 
that optimise (‘balance’: Lépineux, 2005) the results for all 
stakeholders rather than maximise the results for the stock-
holder group.  Thus, management’s role assumes aspects of 
public policy-making in addition to economic analysis.  Policy 
and operational decisions are made through a process of politi-
cal negotiation among dominant stakeholders.  
Our criticism of stakeholder management rests on its impre-
cise relegation of civil society as a distant stakeholder, implicitly 
promoting the inﬁltration of business into the political state. 
As the purportedly ideal mechanism for identifying the spec-
trum of corporate responsibilities, stakeholder management is 
remarkably limited.  The technique, having regard to its super-
ﬁcial regard for social or ecological welfare, would appear some-
what brutal in a ‘caring organization’, the mantra of responsibil-
ity reporting (Calton and Kurland, 1996, p. 164).
Rather than ensure that a society’s members are fairly rep-
resented and that social resources are fairly distributed, stake-
holder management guarantees that smaller voices (such as mi-
nor stockholders, marginalised communities in cities in which 
ﬁrms might operate, and oppressed communities in non-urban 
areas where they do not) are reduced to irrelevancies.  Turn-
ing to environmental considerations, the import of ecological 
systems is assessed from the perspective of threats to the ﬁrm 
(Gray and Milne, 2004) rather than from what we would see as 
the more obvious perspective of the ﬁrm’s threat to ecological 
systems.  
3. Determinants of corporate responsibility practice
Inﬂuences on CSR practice tend to overlap or interact in quite 
complex ways; e.g., when investment ﬁrms spend media dollars 
to educate potential ﬁnancial consumers as to the advantages 
of social investment funds.  Yet, they are analytically distinct in 
terms of their internal logics and immediate empirical referents. 
We proceed by identifying six sets of inﬂuences that might pro-
mote social responsibility actions within the ﬁrm: internal pres-
sures on business managers, pressures from business competi-
tors, investors and consumers, and regulatory pressures coming 
from governments and non-governmental organizations.  
We address each sequentially with respect to:
(i) its internal logic (the conceptual arguments for and against 
it); 
(ii) its empirical salience in terms of the latest relevant re-
search, and 
(iii) our considered opinion regarding its prospects to be a 
signiﬁcant factor in promoting outcomes consistent with social 
welfare.  
The justiﬁcation for depicting these forces and not others is 
threefold: their close relation to the capital accumulation proc-
ess generates the externalization dynamic; the nature of con-
sumer identity in capitalist social formations impacts whether 
‘enlightened consumption’ can be a substantial force promoting 
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CSR; and the direct access to ﬁrms demanded and sought by 
the state and popular mobilizations.  
Other voices would include the media, ‘ecosystem’ consult-
ants, business schools and the general public.  For the sake of 
cogency, we note their potential inﬂuence and point to the work 
of others (Freeman and Gilbert, 1992; Neimark, 1995).
3.1 Internal pressures for CSR
Instrumental arguments for CSR centre on market eﬃciency 
and risk management.  By adopting a set of practices whose 
expected initial beneﬁts are directed away from stockholders 
(while, at the same time, following those that are) the ﬁrm is 
arguably positioned to take advantages of previously unforeseen 
business opportunities, counter the risk of losing presence in 
existing markets and establish a presence in emerging ones.  
Such arguments ignore that managers are not provided com-
pelling incentive to do so ( Jones, 1996).  Assuming (bounded) 
economic rationality, a ﬁrm can only be expected to undertake 
and sustain so-called social responsibility activities and initia-
tives under certain conditions.  If the governance structure of 
a European-American ﬁrm (or that of another ﬁrm seeking 
exposure to developed markets) is functioning properly with 
respect to prioritising the interests of stockholders/owners, 
then management should pursue only those strategies/projects 
designed to enhance or protect the ﬁrm’s position across its rel-
evant markets ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976; McWilliams and 
Siegal, 2001).
A problematic aspect of ﬁrm- or competitive-driven CSR 
concerns the wide variety of deﬁnitions and orientations.  Deﬁ-
nitions are declarative and based on experience, convenience 
and observed practice.  Priorities of ﬁrms vary with respect to 
determining which stakeholders beneﬁt and to what extent. 
For example, the Body Shop’s CSR activities famously focus on 
promoting human rights and environmental sustainability of 
its wholesalers, while those of Starbucks more narrowly target 
employee welfare.  A ﬁrm can be responsive towards one stake-
holder group and simultaneously exploitative of another, mak-
ing somewhat of a mockery of the ethical lineage of the CSR 
concept.  
Unhelpfully, the bulk of the corporate responsibility research 
has left unquestioned the deﬁnitions of responsibility and sus-
tainability adopted by an organization based on the appropria-
tion of surplus value, cost minimization (and thus the maximum 
generation of negative economic externalities) and the produc-
tion of unnecessary products and services.  By overlooking the 
basic dynamic of business, such research encourages its reader 
base to engage in responsibility actions that do not alter the re-
lation of Business ﬁrst, Society second.
In sum, CSR momentum operationalised within the ﬁrm, 
sector, or even the nation-state is unlikely to promote more than 
superﬁciality of expression.  Structural and legal environments 
admit only instrumental forms of CSR.  Unless and until man-
agers’ remuneration packages to force them to recognise nega-
tive economic externalities generated by their ﬁrms, accounting 
models will not be modiﬁed to take into account such ‘environ-
mental’ and ‘social’ costs.  
Fundamentally, while some CSR initiatives might generate 
positive or mitigating eﬀects on externalities, they cannot fun-
damentally alter the externalising engine that powers every busi-
ness ﬁrm and is the primary source of capitalist pathologies.
We consider two main pre-requisites to the eﬀective deploy-
ment of any CSR strategy.  
1. Senior management must have an awareness of the 
content and potential instrumental value of CSR.  Operating 
in accordance with instrumental principles would sanction any 
motivations leading to CSR actions.  Porter and van der Linde 
(2000, p. 131) consider CSR as a competitive driver that re-
quires appropriate resources.  However, for business managers, 
business is ﬁrst.  Social considerations come second and provid-
ing only that such considerations would not open an exploitable 
weakness (Bansal and Roth, 2000).  
The paradigm simply prevents widespread improvements 
consistent with social welfare.  Problematics here include the 
intersection of CSR with managers’ personal values attached to 
remuneration packages based solely on economic performance; 
the need to estimate the net economic impact of a proposed 
CSR strategy even in the absence of clear and transparent met-
rics, and the resources, capabilities and leadership to fund and 
administer CSR strategies (Adams, 2002; Jones, 1996).
Moreover, CSR practice is shaped by legal frameworks man-
dating that corporations focus on economic performance and 
managers’ remuneration being tied to that performance.  The 
separation of CSR from core business operations has been com-
mented in wide contexts (see, Adams, 2002; Dick-Forde, 2005; 
O’Dwyer, 2003).  Despite the widespread promotion of the 
‘business case’ for CSR, the line of research linking CSR disclo-
sures to practice has produced inconsistent results, and it can-
not be said that the choice and amount of disclosure reﬂects the 
extent of performance (Herremans, Akathaporn and McInnes, 
1993; King and Lenox, 2003).  Business managers are faced 
with the performative equation of maximising the gap between 
revenues and relevant costs.  Managers might give CSR more 
attention if they could expect CSR actions to help maximise 
that gap.  
2. Firms may be compelled to react to the ﬁrst-mover 
CSR strategies of their competitors where they believe that fail-
ing to do so would disadvantage them vis à vis market position-
ing.  Strong isomorphic eﬀects are observable across industry 
and strategic group levels where a particular ﬁrst-mover’s CSR 
eﬀorts gain wide positive publicity among dominant stakehold-
ers (Bansal and Roth, 2000).  In these cases, even where the 
CSR strategy has not been proven a ‘winner’ (in terms of net 
payback), other ﬁrms will imitate it because they perceive the 
costs of not doing so are prohibitive.  An entire industry sector 
can thus behaviourally migrate to the position where it adopts 
non-rational responsibilities that transfer wealth to non-vested 
stakeholders.  For example, in Australia during the 1970s, most 
employers in the waste collection industry held generous fam-
ily leave provisions signiﬁcantly in excess of statutory mandates 
and irrespective of labour market conditions (Brooks, 2005).
3.2 External pressures from investors and consumers
Practitioners use various terms to describe managed invest-
ment products oﬀering portfolios screened against social con-
siderations.  We use the term social mutual fund to denote a 
unit trust that markets its use of self-selected social and envi-
ronmental policies in portfolio construction.  At ﬁrst blush, the 
concept of social investment widens the customary conception 
of stockholder value by expressing retail investors’ ethical values 
in terms of arguments advanced by the deep ecology movement 
(Gray, 1992).  
In practice, social mutual funds use the instrumental argu-
ment as a marketing tool.  The line is that by incorporating all 
externalities and pricing goods and services accordingly, invest-
ed corporations will beneﬁt by positioning themselves to take 
advantage of market opportunities and avoid imposts from the 
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state.  Such beneﬁts are expected to ﬂow through to the inves-
tor in the form of increased capital gains and strong dividend 
policies (Statman, 2000): a win-win-win result for investors, 
invested corporations and stakeholder groups.
While belief in the potency of this argument appears in such 
as Bruyn (1987) and Cowton (2004), the evidence at hand 
suggests that most institutional investors do not exert direct 
or indirect pressure on invested corporations to practise CSR. 
Some large pension funds and their agents - the California Pub-
lic Employees’ Retirement System, TIAA-CREF, Innovest and 
Hermes are examples - have on occasion exercised or threatened 
to exercise proxy voting rights to force management to discon-
tinue or adopt certain actions (see, Aguilera et. al, 2006; Becht 
and Roell, 1999; Carleton et. al, 1998; Claessens et. al, 2002). 
Such practices, while not trite, are isolated.  
To judge from investment mandates, most institutional in-
vestors are yet to be convinced that social responsibility is an 
instrumental argument for wealth generation.  (In this context, 
it is unsurprising that social mutual funds accept unaudited cor-
porate self-reports as evidence of practised CSR (Haigh, 2006; 
Mays Report, 2003).  Moreover, mutual and pension funds 
claiming social mandates have accounted for a very small pro-
portion of funds under management (no more than four-tenths 
of one percent [0.4%]) (Haigh and Hazelton, 2004).  Small 
market shares limit the abilities of social funds to directly exert 
pressure on share prices or to gain access to executive managers 
(and so inﬂuence corporate behaviour).  
The second part of this line of argument contends that social 
funds will outperform managed investments that do not ex-
plicitly take into account social considerations.  Studies neither 
conﬁrm nor disconﬁrm systematic diﬀerences between social 
and mainstream investment products.  More recent perform-
ance studies of social funds in various national contexts include 
Ali and Gold (2002), Bauer et al. (forthcoming, 2003, 2006), 
Cummings (2000), DiBartolomeo and Kurtz (1999), King and 
Lenox (2001), Kreander (2001), Kreander, Gray, Power and 
Sinclair (2002), Kurtz (2002) and Statman (2000).  A summary 
of performance studies of managed social investment products 
is available from the authors.
Any other expectation, as it did Gray, Owen and Maunders 
(1988), strikes us as ludicrous.  Most social fund portfolios are 
modeled on mainstream stock market indexes or tailored vari-
ants.  The longest-established socially tailored market indexes 
are Domini (North America), FTSE4Good (UK) and the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Group Indexes (based in Zurich). 
Obviously, social mutual funds are constrained by pressures to 
maintain economically competitive portfolios.  To survive, in-
stitutional investors must sustain a focus on continuously max-
imising economic performance earned on investments in large 
corporations.
Studies of retail investors ﬁnd mixed levels of commitment. 
Milne and Chan (1999) used an experiment to measure the 
positive impact of corporate social disclosures on subjects’ pur-
chasing decisions, ﬁnding limited support.  The survey studies 
of Haigh (2007) and Mackenzie and Lewis (1999) note that 
social investors had invested most of their discretionary invest-
able wealth in mainstream investment products.  Studies of in-
stitutional investor demand for CSR reports present mixed and 
inconclusive results (Freedman and Stagliano, 1991; Patten, 
1990; Freedman and Jaggi, 1988; Shane and Spicer, 1983).  
Ultimately, the contention that social funds might produce 
CSR-type outcomes across industrial sectors is questionable. 
The outperformance argument relies on a social fund distin-
guishing itself in the pack.  Most mainstream ﬁnancial insti-
tutions have oﬀered social investment products for a number 
of years; as such, managers of social funds compete for market 
share and view investment criteria as providing a competitive 
advantage, much as might any fund manager.  Manufacturing 
diﬀerences between portfolio screens negate the potential that 
social funds might exert collective pressure on invested corpora-
tions and produce observable outcomes in industrial sectors.  
From a perspective of market share, the inﬂuence that publicly 
mandated social funds might exert over the operations of indus-
trial sectors would be negligible (Haigh and Hazelton, 2004). 
Such a conundrum is closed to solution: CSR only becomes op-
erationalisable within ﬁnancial services if presenting itself as an 
instrumental argument.  In sum, research and practice suggests 
that corporations with stock held by social funds are more likely 
to ignore than to heed calls for social responsibility actions.
A stream of consumer studies from the 1970s has focused on 
demand characteristics of consumers of products and services 
to which are attached green characteristics: ‘natural’ cosmetics, 
recycled paper, eco-vacations and such like (Crane, 2001; Dav-
is, 1994; Drumwright, 1994; Fisk, 1973; Kinnear, Taylor and 
Ahmed, 1974; Marks and Mayo, 1991; Shrum, McCarty and 
Lowrey, 1995).  Prothero (1990) considers eco-consumerism as 
a strategy to capture new markets.  Smith (1990, p. 88) argues 
for the place of ethical purchase behaviour alongside legislation, 
market forces and individual moral obligation.  
Conceptually, consumers are held to promote CSR practice 
through their purchase decisions in product-markets.  If con-
sumers are consistently willing to pay some form of premium 
for CSR-aﬃliated products (or brands or reputations), produc-
ing ﬁrms will gain competitive advantage, thus forcing non-CSR 
ﬁrms to migrate to similar positions.  This is an extension of the 
basic concept of consumer sovereignty, which has been applied 
elsewhere in modeling citizenry behaviour in political ‘markets’ 
(cf., Jones, 1993).  
The conceptual argument that eco-consumerism can promote 
social welfare is ﬂawed in three respects.  
1. One, the practice of purchasing consumer goods and 
services to pursue social and environmental goals necessarily ac-
cepts the assumptions of neoclassical economics (Smith, 1990, 
p. 185).  The inability of that model to address allocative equity 
within and without economic markets is evident.  
2. Treating social and environmental questions as ancil-
lary to the purchasing act valorises consumption and reiﬁes the 
legitimating myth of consumer sovereignty, when an informed 
assessment of retail industries would show that consumers have 
very little say over what they buy and even less over means of 
production.  Dugger describes processes by which monetarist 
economic policies in the late 20th century, and corporate merg-
ers that took advantage of such policies, created rather than re-
sponded to markets.  Such behaviour suggests that corporations 
do not adjust operations to meet the demands of consumers 
(Dugger, 1989, p. xi).  
3. The proposition of capitalist pathologies being ad-
dressed by the pathogen, as it were, is problematic.  As Heil-
broner (1985) notes, capitalism is not only about producing 
goods and services, but also about producing people, in the sense 
of certain and particular forms of dominant consciousness.  The 
contemporary individual may be inconsistent, alienated, and 
so forth, but he or she still contributes to the reproduction of 
capitalist institutional structures and social relations through 
obligatory acts of consumption and labor.  
We observe problematic empirical relationships between 
ﬁrms’ CSR behaviour, consumers’ perceptions of that behav-
iour, and consumers’ purchasing behaviour.  A recent study by 
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Bhattacharya and Sankar (2004) found that despite indications 
that eight in ten Fortune 500 corporations address CSR issues 
and that eight in ten survey respondents stated they considered 
CSR when making purchasing decisions, robust linkages be-
tween corporate CSR initiatives and actual consumer purchas-
ing patterns did not appear.  Most subjects in the study were 
unaware of claimed corporate CSR activity and those that were 
aware were unwilling to pay premium prices for CSR-embed-
ded goods. 
To sum up this discussion on investors and consumers, the 
notion that a moneyed echelon treating itself to ethical luxury 
will somehow serve to alter basic capitalist dynamics seems ab-
surd.  The literature on consumer boycotts does little to contest 
our perception ( John and Klein, 2003; Tyran and Engelmann, 
2005).  From the perspective of encouraging corporations to 
practise CSR, both eco-products and social investment products 
oﬀer little promise of radical change except to act as a palliative 
to individuals’ consciences (see, Haigh, 2007).  We do not be-
lieve consumers can be counted on to promote CSR outcomes. 
Indeterminate associations between consumers’ perceptions, at-
titudes, values and behaviours would bar CSR from the cost/
beneﬁt deliberations of most manufacturing ﬁrms.  As ﬁrms’ 
overall competitive approaches and diﬀerentiation strategies in-
creasingly integrate CSR initiatives, the quality of information 
transmitted to consumers becomes captured by the marketing 
function, leading to confusion, cynicism and exit choices (Bid-
dle, 2000) - the adverse selection of neoclassical agency theory 
(Kulkarni, 2000).  Such perceptions, if held, might account for 
relatively muted consumer demand for such products and serv-
ices (Mason and Bequette, 1998; Schwartz, 2003).  
3.3 Regulatory pressure
Jurisdictions are yet to require substantive legislation requir-
ing sustainability reporting of all large organizations (Gray and 
Milne, 2002) and a benchmark of government responsiveness 
to CSR has not emerged.  Governments have tended to tax ex-
ternalities since the 1970s by using shifting mixes of tradeable 
permits, direct regulations and corrective market mechanisms 
such as emission standards (Abelson, 2002, p. 155).  
In the United States, the Toxics Release Inventory and other 
environmental legislation is administered through the Environ-
mental Protection Agency and supplemented through a much 
decentralised state-by-state process.  Several European Union 
governments have introduced legislation to make environmen-
tal reporting mandatory for corporations.  Since 1995, the 
Netherlands has oﬀered personal income taxation exemptions 
to retail purchasers of debentures in a reportedly successful at-
tempt (in terms of fund-inﬂows) to stimulate environmentally 
sensitive energy, agriculture and technology projects.  The pro-
viso of the concession is that proceeds of debentures are used to 
fund projects certiﬁed by the government environmental agency 
(Richardson, 2002).  
Other governmental environmental initiatives emanate at the 
EU level.  
- The Restriction of Hazardous Substances (ROHS) 
legislation has applied throughout the EU from July 2006, ban-
ning products containing any more than trace amounts of dan-
gerous substances such as lead or mercury.  
- The Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Act 
commenced in the EU zone in 2004, mandating that electron-
ics manufacturers accept and recycle used electrical products.  
- The Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Re-
striction of Chemicals directive requires that EU-registered 
ﬁrms register chemicals used in manufacturing processes.  The 
EU rules are generating global repercussions as component sup-
pliers must ensure compliance if their parts end up in products 
sold in Europe.  China’s Ministry of Information Industry, for 
example, has announced that it is basing its rules on ROHS.  
Lehman argues that critical evaluation of the state is necessary 
if reformist research agendas are to “tackle the entrenched inter-
ests of corporate power and prestige” (1999, p. 236).  Popular 
books claim weaknesses in government policies and reluctance 
of governments to be branded as anti-free trade, as prominent 
CSR researchers consider regulation as a natural adjunct to im-
proving the social performance of business, contingent only on 
the correct design of market incentives (see a description in Por-
ter and van der Linde, 2000, p. 156). 
It is unlikely that governmental regulatory pressures can be 
counted upon to promote CSR outcomes at the industry and 
ﬁrm levels, for four basic reasons.  
1. A fundamental problematic relates to the costs of en-
suring compliance, which may prove prohibitive either for large 
ﬁrms employing high levels of outsourcing, such as Dell, or 
with respect to new layers of governmental inspectors, adding 
to what many observers already perceive as a bloated EU cen-
tral bureaucracy.  Imposing regulatory compliance costs on the 
business sector increases ﬁrms’ non-productive overheads and 
negatively impacts competitiveness in international markets 
wherever such regulations are not in force.  
2. Lobbying activities of business groups and the reluc-
tance of business to recognise the costs of generated externali-
ties leads to superﬁcial treatments of environmental reporting 
legislation, both by regulators and the regulated.  To illustrate, 
the Australian and British governments require investment 
managers to disclose environmental and social considerations 
used in consumer investment products.  In both jurisdictional 
areas, reporters have been permitted to deﬁne the scope, terms 
and content of relevant disclosures.  Studies have noted mini-
mal information disclosures (Berger, 2004; Coles and Green, 
2003; Friends of the Earth, 2001; Just Pensions, 2004, 2002; 
Mathieu, 2000).
3. The hegemony of economic rationality (Gorz, 1987) 
and its colonization of non-corporate institutions (Deetz, 
1991) means that capital has already won the discursive bat-
tle, although not necessarily through the Trojan horse of CSR 
itself.  The extent to which governments have adopted national 
economic competitiveness as their raison d’être has led to capi-
tal and the state becoming almost indistinguishable from each 
other with respect to public policymaking: e.g., environmental 
taxation (Chomsky, 1999).  
4. Finally, to impose more aggressive environmental and 
social regulations on business would require that states enjoy 
a signiﬁcant degree of autonomy from corporate and ﬁnance 
capital.  In recent decades, globalization has empowered capital 
as the level of institutional pluralism has decreased.  Individual 
states are currently much more dependent on capital than is 
capital on any individual state.  Bourdieu (2001, p. 14) notes 
that states promote market hegemony by endorsing the very 
policies that tend to consign them to the sidelines.  To expect 
that the “left hand of the state” (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 34) would 
price itself out of markets through application of aggressive reg-
ulations attacking negative externalities is unrealistic.  
3.4 Pressures from popular mobilizations
Organizations formed from popular mobilizations, hereafter 
referred to as promotional NGOs, coalesce in various formal 
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and informal alliances with other organizations located in insti-
tutional capital.  Our categorization of NGOs follows Smith’s 
(1990, p. 108) distinctions between sectional, promotional and 
anchored pressure groups.  Sectionals protect the interests of a 
particular component of social systems; promotionals seek to 
address what they consider as pressing ecological or humani-
tarian problems; anchoreds present as promotionals but are 
grounded in sectionals.
Ethicists posit promotional NGOs as the natural facilitators 
of CSR based on their minority membership of corporations 
(Guay, Doh and Sinclair, 2004).  Promotionals are known to 
purchase stock in corporations so as to call special meetings 
to put voting resolutions on single issues, or to attend general 
meetings to vote on matters such as those aﬀecting board com-
position.  As examples:
- The Australian Wilderness Society placed sharehold-
er resolutions at the annual general meetings in 2002 of two 
national Australian banks.  The resolutions were drafted as a 
response to the banks’ holdings in a corporation engaged in old-
growth forestry operations and sought to change the banks’ ar-
ticles of association so as to prohibit those speciﬁc investments. 
- In the 1990s, Greenpeace New Zealand mounted a 
minority resolution in a forestry corporation, seeking to change 
the environmental eﬀects of the said corporation’s wood-chip-
ping processes.  More often, shareholder activists threaten a spe-
cial meeting to gain access to management (Whincop, 2003).  
Promotional and anchored NGOs have also sought occa-
sional collaborations with public corporations and institutional 
investors.  As examples, the Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility, constituted by churches and investment manag-
ers, organizes and documents stockholder resolutions to be put 
to US corporations, while the US Friends of the Earth targets 
many of its publications and activities at mutual funds.  
The Global Reporting Initiative illustrates institutional cap-
ture of promotional NGOs.  The GRI was formed in Boston 
in 1997 after the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible 
Economies secured a ﬁnancial grant from the United Nations 
Foundation and is designated as a UN Environment Program 
Collaborating Center.  The GRI issued its Sustainability Report-
ing Guidelines in 2002, followed by a second edition, known as 
G2, in 2004, and G3 in 2006.  G2 lists hundreds of measures 
that signatories can choose.  Purportedly, all are derived from 
a ‘triple bottom line’ approach: the management doctrine that 
presents accounting proﬁts by reference to impacts on employ-
ees and urban/non-urban environments.  
The conﬂation of sustainability reporting and triple bottom 
line reporting in the GRI is noted by Gray and Milne (2002). 
Sustainability reporting, centred on a resource base rather than 
on the ﬁrm, attempts to account for the fairness of resources 
generated to produce accounting proﬁts by reference to cu-
mulative social and environmental change.  The challenge that 
sustainability reports put to business, managers and regulators 
possibly explains their scarcity.  In contrast, triple bottom line 
reporting refers to attempts to account for an organization’s 
economic, social and environmental performance over a short 
period of time. 
It is not our intention to address the dubious contribution a 
triple bottom line report might make to environmental and so-
cial welfare (see, Brown, Dillard and Marshall, 2005; Gray and 
Milne, 2004).  However, it is worth noting that the industrial 
sectors represented by GRI reporters point to legitimating and 
reputational beneﬁts.  
363 of the total of 429 GRI signatories, or 84 percent (De-
cember 2004), were in politically visible industrial sectors: retail 
products, ﬁnancial services, health care, telecommunications, 
construction, mining and energy.  The tobacco manufacturing 
industry was particularly prominent, with 17 subsidiary com-
panies of the British American Tobacco Group counted as GRI 
reporters.  Corporations engaged in politically sensitive opera-
tions are noted as quick to report their status as GRI reporters 
(Moermann and van der Laan, forthcoming,a).  Legitimation 
as a motivating factor in CSR disclosures is not new (Gelb and 
Strawser, 2001; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Neu, Warsame 
and Pedwell, 1998; Guthrie and Parker, 1989).  
In a sense that the motivations of promotional NGOs are 
replaced with those originating in the business sector (see, Dug-
ger, 1989, p. 144), large corporate signatories to G2/G3 poten-
tially contaminate GRI memberships of less dominant signa-
tories.  The GRI markets its reports as bringing an increased 
ﬁnancial bottom line and providing avenues for new markets 
(see, www.globalreporting.org ).  Against this line of argument, 
small promotional NGOs would struggle for their agendas to 
be recognised in other than an economic discourse.  In terms 
of achieving outcomes consistent with social responsibility, pro-
motional NGOs concern themselves only with reforms likely to 
be accepted by business; that is, with those that can be expressed 
through the discourse of governance guidelines emanating from 
vested interests (examples in ASFA, 2003; IFSA, 2003), not 
with those that would question the role of business in directing 
social progress towards its own ends (see, Daly, 1996; Hajer, 
1997, p. 34).
4. Fresh imagings of the responsibility discourse
We have argued that potential inﬂuences on the ﬁrm for inte-
grative CSR practice have been and are likely to continue to be 
ignored.  To summarize:
- Legally backed economic pressures, perceived threats 
from competitors and perceived expectations of institutional 
investors restrict managerial responsibilities to a demonstration 
that known business opportunities have been exploited at the 
limit of regulatory compliance.  
- Regulated social disclosures have been shown as having 
little eﬀect on the operating methods of institutional investors 
and industrial corporations (UvA, 2005), despite changes in the 
content of social reports and types of reporters (Kolk, 2005).  
- The privileging of the owner stakeholder group in 
Western jurisdictions aﬀords corporations impunity over many 
economic externalities, a vital requirement for the continued 
success of capitalism.  Considered along with private donations 
to states and complexities introduced by state-private sector 
commercial activity, non-onerous corporate legislation can be 
expected to continue.  
- The most visible promotion of corporate social report-
ing practices involving the third sector to date, the Global Re-
porting Initiative, presents as a litany of co-optation and legiti-
mation.
The bulk of the CSR-related management literature sug-
gests a limited future for current conceptualizations of CSR. 
Initiatives leave historical organizational structures intact, are 
designed without stakeholder consultation and are unlikely to 
lead to observable industry-wide outcomes.  Organizational dif-
fusion of sustainability is blocked by practitioner reluctance to 
move away from stockholder primacy and the same of research-
ers to challenge the social performance of their subjects.  
As the world faces social catastrophe from armed conﬂicts, 
widespread poverty and ecological degradation traceable to the 
unchecked pursuit of economic markets (Dowbor, 1997, p. viii; 
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Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Moermann and van 
der Laan, forthcoming,b), CSR research is paralysed, unable 
to oﬀer solutions.  The conﬂict between sustainability (aiming 
to minimise ecological footprints) and the growth of capitalist 
organizations is obvious to any informed researcher (Banerjee, 
2003; Gray and Milne, 2002).  
Paradoxically, the timidity of the studies we address is co-ex-
tensive with an avowed aim of CSR researchers to engage with 
practice.  Caught in a rudderless Sargossian drift, this ostensi-
bly critical line of research is taken up with atomistic analyses 
of corporate governance guidelines, immediate stakeholder re-
lationships, descriptions of social problems in the language of 
ﬁnance and compendiums of social disclosures.  
Acquiring “the quiet force of the taken-for-granted” (Bourdieu, 
2001, p. 80), the perspective uncritically defaults to an organi-
zation-centred perspective.  The perspective provides neither a 
theoretical rudder nor a catalyst for the normative foundations 
of social change, and precludes inquiry into the dynamics of 
stakeholder relations (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, and Jones, 1999; 
Ullman, 1985).  
It is not as if ethicists are unaware of the deﬁciencies; the 
inadequacies of the literature reﬂect “the conceptual apparatus 
[stakeholder management] … pushed beyond its limits” (Free-
man and Gilbert, 1992, p. 12).  Liberal democracies and ‘free’ 
capitalist enterprise rely for their continuing legitimation on the 
advocacy of Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(1969, p. 264); namely, that unceasing capital accumulation, 
consumption and market expansion will provide for the welfare 
of market participants.  Business ethicists ignoring the social ef-
fects of capitalism and the moral injunctions that contextualised 
Smith’s work ( Jones, 1993) are prevented from “rethinking the 
social agents capable of bringing about transformation [in the] 
dynamics of social reproduction” (Dowbor, 1997, p. x).  
The resuscitation of CSR’s epistemic origins in a radical 
agenda (Tinker, Lehman and Neimark, 1991) will require fresh 
imaginings commensurate with a program for social change.  If 
ostensibly socially progressive researchers are to progress the 
corpus of their research, fundamental antagonisms such as the 
primacy of economic interests, that social responsibility actions 
have come to mean only that which can be expressed in mar-
ket discourse, and the going concern assumption of business, all 
need to be questioned.  
Apprehending constructions that allow social responsibility 
as an option would be to the point and reﬂecting on the social 
inequities produced by market-based economies would be a ﬁrst 
step.  Researchers and practitioners rarely admit that trade-oﬀs 
might be necessary if business is to comprehensively address so-
cial needs (Livesey, 2002; Milne, Tregidga and Walton, 2003). 
The arrogance of the assumption that the corporate structure is 
appropriate for producing conditions of social welfare receives as 
little attention.  Priorities of capital accumulation are exercised 
through economic systems privileging beneﬁts to stockholders, 
corporate limited liability and tying managers’ remuneration 
to ﬁnancial performance targets.  Against such questions (re-
maining for the most part unasked) it cannot be the case that all 
management discourses deserve being “made sense of and given 
meaning to” (cf. Freeman and Gilbert, 1992, p. 16).  
This is not to say that calls for radical change have not been 
made.  We point out that such calls are rarely heard in the busi-
ness ethics research appearing in management sciences.  Much 
is taken up with descriptions of social reports and compliance 
with environmental regulations (see, Guthrie and Parker, 1989; 
Gray, Kouhy and Lavers, 1995; Gray, Owen and Maunders, 
1988; Harte, Lewis and Owen, 1991).  A criticism leveled at 
this body of work is that the provision of information to stake-
holders has not in itself yielded insights into the actual relation-
ship of business to urban/non-urban environments (Lehman, 
1999).  
Moreover, the technical mantra most commonly heard in 
management journals (and promoted by consulting companies) 
is that a globalising corporation mitigates its political and repu-
tational risks by adopting CSR actions.  Rarely is CSR analysed 
in terms of strategic risks that might arise following shifts in the 
bargaining powers of a corporation’s stakeholders.
More reﬂective studies from the accounting literature include 
Everett and Neu (2000), noting that the research on environ-
mental regulation ignores the eﬀects of regulation on environ-
mental management; they respond by reﬂexively engaging with 
Enlightenment research conducted in a manifestly exploitative 
world.  Birkin, Edwards and Woodward (2005) consider pos-
sibilities for received notions (such as maximal stockholder 
value) to evolve to an integrative awareness of sustainability is-
sues.  Milne, Kearins and Walton (2004) show how reporters 
appropriate the language of sustainability to avoid addressing 
the possibility that radical change to operations (cessation) may 
be required.  Hanlon and Harney (2005) identify the processes 
by which the discourse of responsibility inﬁltrates social life.  
In organization studies, epistemological criticisms raised by 
Shrivastava (1994) with respect to responsibility-related re-
search have been met by theorising which moves away from 
privileging an organization-centred management-serving 
epistemology.  Departing from the deference conventional ap-
proaches to CSR show toward corporate interests, Daly (1996) 
calls for systems thinking on sustainable economic development 
as a tenable approach to reconﬁguring the capitalist apparatus.  
Kornberger, Carter and Clegg (2004) address the possibilities 
of inter-organizational relationships in corporate hierarchies. 
Crowther, Cooper and Carter (2004) adopt a post-structural-
ist approach to critically evaluate the role of the state and the 
nature of state-business relationships.  Perrow (1997) identi-
ﬁes corporate responsibility as a mechanism whose net eﬀect, 
ironically or otherwise, is to position an organization to better 
exploit its environment.  Newton (2005) and Prasad and Elmes 
(2005) provide isolated calls for radical change, both identifying 
ideological purposes explaining corporate responses to matters 
related to wider social responsibilities.  
From philosophy, Graham (2001) directs attention to the 
moral status of the corporate organizational form, while Att-
ﬁeld (2000) considers the metaphysical credibility of an organi-
zational risk position from which a corporation might justify 
(and so account for) the preservation of ecological-economic 
systems.  
Such references are suggestive only.  See Milne, Kearins and 
Walton (2004) for a list of references to critical studies in or-
ganization studies which address moral responsibilities.  The 
point we make is that critical engagement with the dynamics 
of CSR practice is found on research ﬁelds other than busi-
ness ethics.  The works we have cited immediately above can 
be distinguished from much of the CSR-related management 
literature for recognising that extra-legal deﬁnitions of organi-
zational responsibility are likely to carry strategic dislocations 
with unintended organizational consequences.  
Praxis in research
If scholars are also to participate meaningfully in processes 
of social change, appropriately radical approaches need to be 
adopted.  Tinker (2005) reminds that the call to critical re-
search is a progressive one, requiring passion and commitment 
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if theory and practice are to condition and inform each other. 
The observation that “analysis that begins from unreﬂective be-
ginnings is likely to lead to voluntaristic proposals for reform 
while failing to detail the exact political steps needed to enact 
change” (Tinker, 2005, p. 110) resonates in the CSR-related lit-
erature we address.  
The eﬀectiveness of much of the CSR-related work, at least in 
terms of contribution to practice, is weakened from inadequate 
and diﬀuse theoretical underpinnings.  Consequently, underly-
ing values appear incoherent and irrelevant, and even if well-in-
tentioned, default to the economically instrumental argument, 
which by privileging the economic interests of the corporation, 
avoids mounting a challenge to socio-economic status qua.  
Approaches need to be synthesised from organization stud-
ies, accounting and philosophy if the “present crises of capital-
ism” (namely, mass unemployment stemming from the genera-
tion of surplus value: Tinker and Carter, 2003, p. 578) are to 
be progressively addressed on political grounds.  Certain per-
spectives developed by Foucault, Freire and Bourdieu justify the 
need to search for appropriately critical epistemologies for CSR 
research and provide suitable directions.  These are considered 
in turn below and close the essay.
Foucauldian, Freirian and activist perspectives
A certain Foucauldian perspective on ethical development is rel-
evant to analysing the prioritising processes of corporate man-
agers.  Forming part of his development of an ethics of care, 
Foucault draws from and develops two sources: one, Nietzsche’s 
work on morality, which looked towards the origin of the ‘free 
spirit’ in ethics as practised by the rulers of ancient Greece; and 
two, Schopenhauer’s work on moral empowerment of the indi-
vidual agent.  
The outcome for Foucault (2001) is to oﬀer Socratic parrhe-
sia (moral courage) as a critical device for studies of modernity. 
Socratic parrhesia refers to a type of relationship between the 
speaker and what he or she says, free of rhetorical form and car-
rying personal risk to the speaker (Foucault, 2001, p. 12).  Soc-
rates used parrhesia when daring to speak freely to his superiors 
“because what he says accords exactly with what he thinks, and 
what he thinks accords exactly with what he does” (Foucault, 
2001, p. 101).  
These behavioural aspects would contribute to a game of 
truth-telling in which business is encouraged to disclose the 
truth of claims that they recognise extra-legal responsibilities. 
The positioning of the researcher in a parrhesiastic stance, we 
contend, is apposite to the purposes of responsibility-related re-
search: namely, to disseminate the adoption of CSR initiatives 
and act as agent for social and organizational change.  
Many researchers/universities would risk losing consultan-
cies/funding if challenging the commitments of their clients/
benefactors to advancing social welfare, or if they were to meas-
ure and publish the (limited) inﬂuence their own studies had 
on promoting CSR practice.  Yet, challenges and self-criticisms 
are needed if CSR research is to promote praxis (changes to the 
orthodoxies of business), even if carrying a risk of economic loss 
or professional isolation.  Only if academe and business are will-
ing to take on such risks will stakeholder management advance 
beyond the neo-liberal promise as reﬂected in the instrumental 
line of argument, as described above.  To this end, progress is 
possible only if researchers are prepared to adopt a courageous 
position from which to contest corporate activity; in other 
words, if researchers justify, in terms of social and environmen-
tal welfare, the epistemological and ideological bases underlying 
their research.  
(Note is made of the criticism of ahistoricism leveled at many 
Foucauldian studies.  Also see Tinker (2005) for an objection 
to Foucault’s implicit endorsement of the ethics of personhood 
and, by extension, of neo-liberalism.)  
Calling for researchers to make a simultaneous “reﬂection and 
action upon the world in order to transform it” (1972, p. 28), 
Freire has challenged educationalists to question such as disinte-
grating human relations, unbridled consumerism, deference ac-
corded to the pursuit of economic markets, ideological purposes 
of neo-liberalism and the appropriateness of accepted forms of 
social governance (Dowbor, 1997, p. vi).  At some risk to their 
business models, business schools might consider the useful-
ness of introducing such questions into corporate responsibil-
ity curricula.  Of course, Freire’s ideas would challenge guarded 
management consultancies as much as narrowly focussed uni-
versity business ethics courses. This intimacy of danger provides 
a compelling reason for academic researchers moonlighting as 
part-time consultants to argue for political change, rather than, 
as is now the case, making superﬁcial examinations of isolated 
CSR actions.
Before any of this, however, CSR researchers need to com-
plete three preliminary steps.  
First, interconnections between corporate and non-corporate 
forms of organization need examination.  The extent to which 
lobby groups curtail the force of the state as a potential agent for 
corporate change cannot be ignored (Tinker and Carter, 2003). 
Second, researchers need to radicalise the dividing practice 
(“symbolic domination”: Bourdieu, 2001, p. 20) of ranking Busi-
ness ﬁrst, Society second.  The agendas of many CSR research-
ers, to judge from their published work, indicate a championing 
rather than a questioning of the corporate form of organization, 
and of its economic interests.  
Third, CSR researchers must reconsider their own commit-
ment to progressive research.  Progress depends on mobilizing 
the “organizational means to encourage all competent research-
ers to unite their eﬀorts with those of […] responsible activists” 
(Bourdieu, 2001, p. 15).  A personal risk to business scholars 
is that by being associated with the activism of groups such as 
Corpwatch or Christian Aid (as examples) scholars put them-
selves at risk of being professionally marginalised in their busi-
ness schools.  
Activism, however, takes many forms, some of which are more 
direct than others.  The choice of research approach is demanded 
by its context.  For the committed responsibility researcher, the 
co-opting forces of capitalism demand an unﬂinchingly critical 
epistemology.  The courageousness of such a position is that by 
challenging structures that reward only those that participate in 
the market, scholars risk their own positions of privilege.
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